European Democracy Shield

Contribute to Nets4Dem recommendations for the European Democracy Shield

Phase 1 of 4

Suggestions and amendments 03/02/2025 - 07/02/2025

Process phases

Changes at "Recommendation 1: Increase funding for Civil Society Organisations and independent researchers to produce actionable evidence on DSA non-compliance."

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-["
In her mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, President von der Leyen emphasised the need for rapid and effective enforcement actions under the DSA. To achieve this, the Commission must support a network of experts, including CSOs, who can provide actionable insights in a complex and rapidly evolving landscape. For example, during the 2024 European Parliament elections DRI reports revealed how inauthentic accounts on TikTok amplified far-right content, enabling parties to circumvent the platform's stricter rules on political accounts. Our social media monitoring of online political discourse also examined discourse toxicity and disinformation narratives.
We need to do a lot more of this kind of research otherwise the DSA and the AI Act will be law in the books only.
"]
+["
In her mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, President von der Leyen emphasised the need for rapid and effective enforcement actions under the DSA. To achieve this, the Commission must support a network of experts, including CSOs, who can provide actionable insights in a complex and rapidly evolving landscape. For example, during the 2024 European Parliament elections DRI reports revealed how inauthentic accounts on TikTok amplified far-right content, enabling parties to circumvent the platform's stricter rules on political accounts. Our social media monitoring of online political discourse also examined discourse toxicity and disinformation narratives.
We need to do a lot more of this kind of research otherwise the DSA and the AI Act will be law in the books only.
"]

-["In her mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, President von der Leyen emphasised the need for rapid and effective enforcement actions under the DSA. To achieve this, the Commission must support a network of experts, including CSOs, who can provide actionable insights in a complex and rapidly evolving landscape. For example, during the 2024 European Parliament elections DRI reports revealed how inauthentic accounts on TikTok amplified far-right content, enabling parties to circumvent the platform's stricter rules on political accounts. Our social media monitoring of online political discourse also examined discourse toxicity and disinformation narratives. <ul><li><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/the-big-loophole-and-how-to-close-it-how-tiktoks-policy-and-practice-invites-murky-political-accounts\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">The big loophole (and how to close it): How TikTok's policy and practice invites murky political accounts.</a> (July 2024). </li><li><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/local-insights-european-trends-case-studies-on-digital-discourse-in-the-2024-ep-elections\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Local Insights, European Trends: Case Studies on Digital Discourse in the 2024 EP Elections.</a> (August 2024). </li><li><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/youtube\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Click Here for Controversy: Disinformation Narratives on YouTube During the 2024 EP Campaign.</a> (September 2024). </li></ul>We need to do a lot more of this kind of research otherwise the DSA and the AI Act will be law in the books only."]
+["In her mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, President von der Leyen emphasised the need for rapid and effective enforcement actions under the DSA. To achieve this, the Commission must support a network of experts, including CSOs, who can provide actionable insights in a complex and rapidly evolving landscape. For example, during the 2024 European Parliament elections DRI reports revealed how inauthentic accounts on TikTok amplified far-right content, enabling parties to circumvent the platform's stricter rules on political accounts. Our social media monitoring of online political discourse also examined discourse toxicity and disinformation narratives.<ul><li> <a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/the-big-loophole-and-how-to-close-it-how-tiktoks-policy-and-practice-invites-murky-political-accounts\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">The big loophole (and how to close it): How TikTok's policy and practice invites murky political accounts.</a> (July 2024).</li><li> <a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/local-insights-european-trends-case-studies-on-digital-discourse-in-the-2024-ep-elections\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Local Insights, European Trends: Case Studies on Digital Discourse in the 2024 EP Elections.</a> (August 2024).</li><li> <a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/youtube\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Click Here for Controversy: Disinformation Narratives on YouTube During the 2024 EP Campaign.</a> (September 2024).</li></ul><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/youtube\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">W</a>e need to do a lot more of this kind of research otherwise the DSA and the AI Act will be law in the books only."]

Deletions

-["In her mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, President von der Leyen emphasised the need for rapid and effective enforcement actions under the DSA. To achieve this, the Commission must support a network of experts, including CSOs, who can provide actionable insights in a complex and rapidly evolving landscape. For example, during the 2024 European Parliament elections DRI reports revealed how inauthentic accounts on TikTok amplified far-right content, enabling parties to circumvent the platform's stricter rules on political accounts. Our social media monitoring of online political discourse also examined discourse toxicity and disinformation narratives. <ul><li><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/the-big-loophole-and-how-to-close-it-how-tiktoks-policy-and-practice-invites-murky-political-accounts\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">The big loophole (and how to close it): How TikTok's policy and practice invites murky political accounts.</a> (July 2024). </li><li><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/local-insights-european-trends-case-studies-on-digital-discourse-in-the-2024-ep-elections\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Local Insights, European Trends: Case Studies on Digital Discourse in the 2024 EP Elections.</a> (August 2024). </li><li><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/youtube\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Click Here for Controversy: Disinformation Narratives on YouTube During the 2024 EP Campaign.</a> (September 2024). </li></ul>We need to do a lot more of this kind of research otherwise the DSA and the AI Act will be law in the books only."]

Additions

+["In her mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, President von der Leyen emphasised the need for rapid and effective enforcement actions under the DSA. To achieve this, the Commission must support a network of experts, including CSOs, who can provide actionable insights in a complex and rapidly evolving landscape. For example, during the 2024 European Parliament elections DRI reports revealed how inauthentic accounts on TikTok amplified far-right content, enabling parties to circumvent the platform's stricter rules on political accounts. Our social media monitoring of online political discourse also examined discourse toxicity and disinformation narratives.<ul><li> <a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/the-big-loophole-and-how-to-close-it-how-tiktoks-policy-and-practice-invites-murky-political-accounts\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">The big loophole (and how to close it): How TikTok's policy and practice invites murky political accounts.</a> (July 2024).</li><li> <a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/local-insights-european-trends-case-studies-on-digital-discourse-in-the-2024-ep-elections\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Local Insights, European Trends: Case Studies on Digital Discourse in the 2024 EP Elections.</a> (August 2024).</li><li> <a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/youtube\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Click Here for Controversy: Disinformation Narratives on YouTube During the 2024 EP Campaign.</a> (September 2024).</li></ul><a href=\"https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global/publications/youtube\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">W</a>e need to do a lot more of this kind of research otherwise the DSA and the AI Act will be law in the books only."]

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Joel Berenguer Moncada

Version created at 31/01/2025 16:15